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China’s Rise and its Increasing Role in ASEAN

By Dorothy-Grace Guerrero

Since joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, China increased its involvement in Asia to enhance its global competitiveness. The Chinese government shifted its diplomatic strategy from that of a developing country focused on issues of domestic concerns towards one that is taking regional and global leadership. This raised questions concerning the nature of China’s rise and its implications. To assuage suspicions of  Chinese hegemonic ambitions, Chinese leaders often emphasize in global meetings and high-level visits to the region that China intend to strengthen mutual political trust and economic co-prosperity with its neighbours.

The prediction by many analysts that China will be the world’s most powerful economy by 2050 was echoed by a warning from US Congress representatives about such overtake[1]. The countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started to strengthen their bilateral relationship with China in recognition of China’s growing role as a source of investment. ASEAN leaders are increasingly recognizing the benefit of a growing Chinese demand for ASEAN products to the economic growth of its members.

China is indeed rapidly becoming the predominant power in Asia Pacific and is starting to challenge the role of both the United States and Japan in the region. The question is: will China’s increasing importance in the region make ASEAN countries more prosperous, more stable, and equitable? To address this question, one must understand the current importance of China and the many challenges that come with China’s new role in the region.

ASEAN-China Relations

The ASEAN-China relations began in 1991 when China first expressed its interest for closer cooperation with ASEAN during the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended the meeting as a guest of the Malaysian Government. Relations were formalized during the Bangkok Ministerial Meeting through an exchange of letters between then ASEAN Secretary General Dato Ajit Singh and Qian Qichen in 1994. Qian was also China’s Vice Premier at that time. Two joint committees were set up as a result: the Scientific and Technological Cooperation and the Economic and Trade Cooperation.

China gained full dialogue status with ASEAN during the 29th Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta in 1996. All mechanisms at the working level were coordinated through the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee. During this meeting China also agreed to the establishment of the ASEAN-China Cooperation Fund. The ASEAN-China Senior Officials Political Consultation was also set up as a forum on political and security issues. A Code of Conduct on the use of the South China Sea was also established as a means to prevent conflict and promote peace in the region.

As developing countries, ASEAN members and China share a common interest to strengthen economic relations. China initiated the establishment of an Expert Group within the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee to study the various areas for trade and economic cooperation between China and the ASEAN.

The financial crisis that hit Asian countries in 1997 brought the region together to discuss common responses to the crisis during the ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur that year. The evolution of the ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and South Korea) was a recommendation of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) formed to propose possible areas of cooperation for ASEAN Plus Three. The EAVG suggested an East Asian Summit arrangement, which led to the creation of a Study Group that prepared a report about its process. The group’s final report was presented to the 2002 ASEAN Plus Three Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

ASEAN adopted the Asean Plus Three (APT) Framework during the 2004 ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos. It will be recalled that the idea of an East Asian formation was originally proposed by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad as an East Asian Economic Caucus in 1991. PM Mahathir’s proposal, which was then dubbed as the “Caucus without Caucasians”, failed due mainly to the strong opposition by the US which was excluded in the all-Asian caucus. When current Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi resurrected his predecessor’s idea of an East Asian Community in the 2004 APT meeting in Vientiane, Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao immediately supported it. This resulted in the historic First East Asian Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in 2005.

Two Giants in the Same Mountain

The First East Asian Summit (EAS) was held despite tensions that surfaced in the latter part of its formation. The fact that it was realized despite the stark difference between the original proposal and the one that was actually inaugurated showed the resilience of the ASEAN Plus Three. Indeed instead of just an ASEAN + 3 Summit, it became an ASEAN + 3 + 3 for the Summit also brought along India, Australia and New Zealand.

The Summit was China’s trial balloon for the realization of an East Asia Community, which was inspired by the case of the European Union. China saw an opportunity to steer East Asian multilateralism along the lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to serve Beijing’s strategic goals and further weaken the US influence in East Asia[2]. Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was met by Japan’s strategy of including India, Australia and New Zealand. In effect the 2005 EAS was a proxy battle between China and Japan.

China’s proposal to divide the EAS members into core (APT with China as dominant player) and secondary (India, Australia, New Zealand) categories in the eve of the EAS met strong opposition from Japan, which insisted that an enlarged framework beyond the ASEAN Plus Three is more viable for an East Asian Community. Japan’s inclusion of the three countries was aimed at counterbalancing Chinese influence in East Asia. China’s proposal of a further deepening of the ASEAN+3 structure, which China sees as the foundation on which an eventual East Asian Community would be based, was supported by South Korea, Burma, Thailand and Malaysia. Japan’s view of enlargement was supported by Indonesia.

Though not invited to the ASEAN Plus Three, the US supported Japan’s proposal. The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made comments to the effect that the inclusion of such “democratic states” as Australia, New Zealand and India in the East Asia Summit would be a most welcome initiative[3]. India saw its inclusion in the EAS as an opportunity to promote its “Look East” policy, which is in line with the “congage China” strategy hatched by a US-India-Japan alliance[4]. The “congage” (contain plus engage) China strategy first came out in the late 1990s when the US realized that neither prevention-containment nor engagement with China serves the US interest. “Congagement” seeks to accomplish three things: preserve the hope inherent in the engagement policy of the US with China while deterring China from becoming hostile and hedging against the possibility that a strong China might challenge US interests[5].  China on the other hand wanted to ensure that India remains at the margins of an emerging East Asian Community.

In the end, because of conflicting objectives, the First EAS was not able to come up with a common declaration. APT deepening supporters led by China did not want a joint Summit Declaration referring to an East Asia Community that includes non-East Asians. Those supporting APT+3, on the other hand, did not want a narrow ASEAN Plus Three focus.  ASEAN took the steer by making sure that the hosting of future EAS remains with it, ensuring that ASEAN drives the initiative towards an East Asian Community.

The rift in the First EAS mimicked the Sino-Japanese conflict. If their feud continues to be stoked, Japan and China may well be a case of the proverbial two giants sharing a mountain. The feud is continually reignited by a number of sparks, including: Beijing’s blocking of Japan’s bid to have a permanent seat in the UN Security Council; the competing claims to petroleum deposits and islands in the East China Sea; and, China’s irritation at the visits of former Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine where Japan’s war dead, fourteen of whom are considered war criminals by China and South Korea, are buried. Unless these two giants settle their historical differences, it is doubtful whether a broader East Asian Community is possible.

The European Community is said to have inspired the building of an East Asian Community. Unlike the EC, however, East Asians are glued together by economic drive and constrained by very incompatible politics. Bridging the conflicting politics between Japan and China requires the settling of debts. Germany’s owning up to its accountability for past adventurisms may well be a key example for Japan. Germany apologized to the Jews for the crimes committed to them by the Nazis. Despite the debate in Germany about the limitations of the mandatory Holocaust Education, there is commitment in the teaching of this part of history to German students. The issues about Japanese history textbooks that downplay Japan’s treatment of China during World War II, on the contrary, remain unsettled.

ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreements

The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreements (ACFTA) is a crucial component of East Asian regional economic integration. In 2002, Chinese and ASEAN Leaders signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and decided that an ASEAN-China FTA would be set up in 10 years. When realized, the ASEAN-China FTA will be the largest FTA in Asia. It will also be the biggest FTA between developing countries and biggest in terms of population covered representing a market of 1.85 billion consumers and a combined gross domestic product of almost 2.5 trillion dollars. The ACFTA will be fully implemented for the ASEAN-6 in 2010, and will integrate Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia by 2015.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dorothy-Grace Guerrero is a Research Associate with Focus on the Global South and heads its China Programme. She may be reached at [email protected].

[1] Jonathan Watts, “China’s Powerhouse vision for 2050”, The Guardian February 10 2006.

[2] Mohan Malik, “The East Asia Summit: More Discord then Accord”, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, February 2006.

[3] Noriko Hama, “How Not to Build an East Asian Community”, www.OpenDemocracy.net December 9, 2005.

[4] Malik, p.4.

[5] Zalmay Khalilzad,  “Congage China”, RAND Issue Papers 187, 1999.